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philosophical conception of behaviorism

According to behaviorism, everything there is to know or say about people with regard to their mental states can be known or said in terms of their observable behaviors (including verbal behaviors), and furthermore, all there is to mental states themselves are certain patterns of behavior or dispositions to behave. There are three core claims of behaviorism: (1) an epistemological claim (mental states are knowable only via behavior), (2) a semantic claim (mental-state words like belief have meanings definable in terms of behavior), and (3) a metaphysical claim (either there are no mental states, just behaviors and dispositions to behave, or there are mental states but they are identical to behaviors or dispositions to behave). [Source: Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Social Sciences; Behaviorism, Philosophical Conception of]

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